Quantification theory, or first-order predicate logic, can be formulated in terms purely of predicate letters and a few predicate functors which attach t o predicates to form further predicates. Apart from the predicate letters, which are schematic, there are no variables. On this score the plan is reminiscent of the combinatory logic of Schonfinkel and Curry. Theirs, however, had the whole of higher set theory as its domain; the present scheme stays within the bounds of predicate logic.
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In 1960 I published an apparatus to this effect, and an improved version in 1971. In both versions I assumed two inversion functors, major and minor; also a cropping functor and the obvious complement functor. The effects of these functors, when applied to an n-place predicate, are as follows:
The variables here are explanatory only and no part of the final notation. Ultimately the predicate letters need exponents showing the number of places, but I omit them in these pages.
A further functor-to continue now with the 1971 version-waspadding:
Finally there was a zero-place predicate functor, which is to say simply a constant predicate, namely the predicate 'I' of identity, and there was a two-place predicate functor ' n ' of intersection. The intersection 'F n G' received a generalized interpretation, allowing 'F' and 'G' to be predicates with unlike numbers of places. However, Steven T. Kuhn has lately shown me that the generalization is unnecessary and reducible to the homogeneous case. I showed that the sentence schemata, that is, zero-place predicate schemata, that are expressible in these terms are intertranslatable with the closed schemata of classical predicate logic including identity.
There are advantages, I now find, in supplementing this apparatus with a rejection functor that was in the 1960 version. It is explained thus:
The gains are as follows. (a) The identity predicate can be dropped, leaving us with an exact equivalent of classical predicate logic without identity, whereas dropping it would have left the 1971 apparatus weaker than predicate logic. (b) A neat division of labor emerges between purely combinatory functors, viz. padding, reflection, and the two inversions, on the one hand, and the alethic or truth-oriented ones on the other, viz. cropping, complement, and intersection. The distinctively combinatory business of variables is thus isolated and instructively anatomized. In the previous papers the combinatory work depended on occasional help from the alethic functors. (c) The proof that the apparatus is adequate for predicate logic becomes very simple and intuitive.
The division of labor promised in (b) can be appreciated as follows. The two inversion functors, applied in iteration to an n-place predicate, suffice to effect any desired permutation of the n arguments; this is noted in the previous papers and is easily seen. In particular then we can permute any duplicate arguments to initial position and then drop duplications by applying 'Ref'. By 'Pad', moreover, we can add extraneous arguments at will, afterward permuting them to any desired positions. The upshot is that our four combinatory functors suffice, without outside aid, to homogenize any two predications-that is, to endow them with matching strings of arguments-and to leave the arguments in any desired order, devoid of repetitions. For instance the heterogeneous predications 'Fwzwxy' and 'Gvxyz' are verifiably equivalent to these homogeneous ones :
The three alethic functors-cropping, complement, and intersection-can be artificially and unsurprisingly compacted into a single two-place functor by elaborating on Sheffer's stroke function. This new functor, which I write 'I)' and call the divergence functor, is explained thus:
Where 'Fxy' and 'Gxy' mean 'x reads y' and 'x understands y', 'F 11 G' is the predicate 'understood by no readers thereof'.
As is readily verified, our three original alethic functors are expressible in terms of 'Pad' and the divergence functor as follows:
So our functors are now down to the four combinatory ones ('Inv', 'inv', 'Pad', 'Ref') and the divergence functor. This compaction is of little intrinsic interest, but it will expedite the proof, promised in (c) above, that the functors are adequate for classical predicate logic.
To further expedite that proof I next note a corresponding compaction of that logic itself. All we need there is a variable-binding divergence operator which I shall write ' I , ' , where the variable is vacuous, that is, foreign to both sides. The rest of the truth functions are expressible in terms of the stroke in familiar fashion, and the quantification '(x)Fx' is definable as ' -Fx 1 , -Fx'. Every schema of classical predicate logic can now be conceived as built from atomic predications by iteration solely of the divergence operator. This was noted by Schonfinkel. Thus armed, we can make short work of the adequacy proof. Problem: given a closed schema S of predicate logic built up by divergence operators, to translate it into terms of our four combinatory functors and the divergence functor. Choose any innermost occurrence in S of the divergence operator, that is, any occurrence that has no divergence formula flanking it. It is flanked rather by two simple pre- The variable 'x' has disappeared. Then we proceed similarly with another innermost occurrence of the divergence operator, and get rid thus of another variable. As we continue this process, divergence operators that were not innermost in S become innermost' and give way in turn to single predications, and a variable disappears each time. In the end S in its entirety reduces to a single predication 'Ozl ... z,'. But S had no free variables; all its variables were bound by divergence operators, and all are now gone. So k = 0; we are left with merely 'O', which is some zero-place predicate schema, some sentence schema, built up of predicate letters by the four combinatory functors and the divergence functor. I -J In the matter of compaction of predicate functors it may be noted further that the two inversion functors can be supplanted by the Myrc, permutation functor, explained thus : This reduction, due to George Myro, was noted in the 1976 reprinting of my 1971 paper, and it carries over to the present approach. It leaves us with just 'Perm', 'Pad', 'Ref', and the divergence functor. At this point, however, the division between combinatory and alethic labor becomes blurred again; part of the combinatory burden now devolves upon the cropping functor and thus ultimately the divergence functor.
